Russian forces in Crimea has destabilized the region further and exacerbated insecurity and uncertainty. Russia's militarization of Crimea has given Moscow the ability to exert control over the whole of the Black Sea and has been characterized by General Philip Breedlove, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's supreme allied commander for Europe, as a major cause of concern to NATO. 2 Russian attempts to advance its strategic interests in the region have also created a maritime security dilemma in the Black Sea, prompting an increase in NATO engagement and US maritime presence, which further exacerbate tensions with Moscow. Because of these developments, traditional maritime security threats such as conflicting maritime claims, changes in the maritime balance of power, an increase in naval activity, and military conflict on the shores of the Black Sea have come to define the core elements of the maritime agendas in the region. This essay makes the case that (1) a traditional and narrower definition of maritime security is more appropriate for an understanding of the dynamics of maritime power in the Black Sea and that (2) while elements of the "new" maritime agenda are still important, in particular, pollution and nuclear trafficking, the ability of the Black Sea states to mitigate these problems is hostage to the dynamics of more conventional maritime conflict.
The essay is divided into three sections. The first begins by examining the contemporary literature on maritime security and argues that while the debate is dominated by discussion of newer security concerns, there has been a resurgence of conventional maritime security challenges, like those in the Black Sea, which can crowd out newer maritime security challenges. The second section examines the many intractable conventional maritime security challenges in the Black Sea. These include the significant buildup of Russian forces and capabilities in Crimea, which has increased tensions between littoral states and strengthened Russia's power projection capabilities both in and beyond the Black Sea. The seizure by Russia of Ukrainian maritime assets in the Black Sea and Russian support of separatists in the east has brought conflict directly to the shores of the Black Sea. The annexation has also opened the very real possibility of conflicting maritime claims. Ukraine's maritime borders are now contested, particularly around Crimea and in the Sea of Azov, and for the first time, Romania also shares an undefined maritime border with the Russian Federation. Increasing tension between the two key maritime powers in the Black Sea, Turkey and the Russian Federation, over Crimea and Syria has also created a more challenging and far less cooperative maritime security environment in the region. Because of these developments in the Black Sea, the United States and NATO have also significantly increased maritime operations and cooperation with regional states, which further exacerbates regional tension. Having discussed these challenges the essay's final section then looks at two of the more important newer security issues, pollution and nuclear trafficking, and examines how these have ultimately become much more difficult to address given the emergence of more conventional maritime security threats.
Maritime Security
Although there is no consensus on how to define maritime security, much of the literature and recent debates have tended to focus on high-profile new rather than more traditional threats or challenges to and from the sea. 3 These include piracy and armed robbery against ships; terrorist acts involving shipping, offshore installations, and other maritime interests; illicit trafficking in arms, weapons of mass destruction, and drugs; smuggling and trafficking of people; illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing; and intentional and unlawful damage to the marine environment. 4 The emergence of maritime security as a more multidimensional concept can be explained by a number of factors, including the general trend in security studies since the end of the Cold War to look beyond traditional military definitions of security and adopt a much broader and more holistic understanding that includes economic, political, environmental, and societal factors. This widening of the maritime security discussion to include issues such as maritime terrorism at and from the sea was given added momentum after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States. Other factors that have led to the broadening of maritime security as a concept include the extension of national maritime jurisdiction as a result of the signing of the Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which came into force in 1994 and gave states new rights and responsibilities in their maritime domain. The UNCLOS demarcation of contiguous and exclusive economic zones for coastal states means that the maritime domain is now a resource to be secured and managed. Finally, globalization has created an increasingly interdependent world in which a state's economic well-being is intrinsically linked with and dependent on the free movement of trade.
Because of these changes in the international system and in how security is conceptualized, the debate on maritime security has been largely dominated by discussions of new challenges in the maritime domain. 5 However, these newer security challenges have been crowded out by the emergence of much more traditional maritime security threats in the Black Sea. In essence, interstate maritime security challenges have trumped new transnational maritime security issues and pushed them off the security agenda. The Black Sea, like the South China Sea, another increasingly contested maritime domain, is awash with highly complex challenges involving high levels of disagreement among littoral states about the nature of maritime security problems and how to address them. 6 Maritime security threats identified in the South China Sea include conflicting maritime claims, the problems of naval rearmament, balancing between key players, and managing the risks of greater naval activity in the region. 7 These more traditional maritime security challenges differ from the newer security challenges that also exist in the 8. Bateman, "Solving the 'Wicked Problems,' " 2. maritime environment in the South China Sea. 8 While recognizing that newer security threats such as pollution or nuclear trafficking can still be complex, they are different from more traditional maritime security challenges as they can be clearly defined and their solutions identified and worked through. The Black Sea states are also faced with a complex mix of traditional and new maritime security challenges, and the latter have become much harder to address because of the reemergence of much more traditional maritime security threats. The failure by the Black Sea states to address, in particular, the two most pressing and serious newer security challenges, pollution and nuclear trafficking, will, however, further damage the region's economies and could also threaten international security.
Traditional Maritime Security Threats
The Russian annexation of Crimea has significantly increased Russia's strategic footprint in the Black Sea and, given the recent fortification of Crimea, its ability to project power in the region, creating a more challenging maritime security environment for all the littoral states. In a bid to reinforce the peninsula in the early months after the annexation, Russia implemented its Crimean Defense Plan and moved quickly to "supply modern and advanced types of arms and military equipment" and enhance "the combat readiness and combat capability as well as the standards of combat training of all the formations and military units" deployed. 9 As part of this plan, Russia developed a fully capable air defense system and deployed mobile long-range antiship systems, which, together with similar systems installed on the coast of Krasnodar, give Russia the ability to control about a third of the Black Sea. 10 The movement of Iskander mobile ballistic missile systems into Crimea ensures that Russia has the capability to target any moving ship in the Black Sea. Russia has also almost doubled the number of service personnel in Crimea, creating seven new military formations and eight military units in addition to those available to the Black Sea Fleet. 11 The number of tanks and combat armored vehicles has also been increased in Crimea by a factor of almost seven, artillery systems are 7.2 times higher than before the annexation, and the number of helicopters and submarines has doubled. 12 Russia has also replaced the aviation component of the Black Sea Fleet, landing its first fourteen multirole Su-27SM and Su-30 fighters at Belbek airport in Crimea. 13 Estimates suggest that Moscow has spent almost $750 million in upgrading these forces in Crimea and essentially "turned the peninsula into an iron fortress capable, not just of defending itself, but also of delivering missile strikes on ground targets in central and southern Ukraine." 14 As part of this buildup, in late 2015 the Black Sea Fleet took delivery of two new missile ships, the first of their class to be delivered since 2002, and a new third-generation submarine. 15 Commenting on the upgrading and renewal of Russian capabilities in Crimea, Breedlove, allied commander of NATO in Europe, stated that the new weapons systems "have turned Crimea into a strong force projection beachhead in the region." 16 The seizure of Crimea has also led to a significant increase in Russia's maritime infrastructure, assets, and ability to use the Black Sea. As well as gaining full and unrestricted access to the port of Sevastopol, Russia has acquired the former Ukrainian naval bases of Novoozerne on Donuzlav Bay, Myrnyi, Saky, Balaklava, and a marine infantry base in Feodosiia. 17 Russia has also inherited seven shipyards in Crimea, enhancing its ability to upgrade its power projection in the Black Sea. It has ambitious plans to further strengthen its maritime power in Crimea in 2020 -25, to include increasing the number of service personnel, armaments, air assets, and missile systems as well as the size, power projection capabilities, and access denial ability of the Black Sea Fleet. 18 Under these plans, the Black Sea Fleet will be significantly augmented, with up to six new frigates, two new missile corvettes, and six Kilo-class diesel-powered submarines. 19 This buildup of Russian maritime power constitutes a security challenge as it threatens to destabilize the region further and exacerbates insecurity. The Russian annexation of Crimea, as well as the buildup of its powerprojection capabilities, led the former Romanian president, Victor Ponta, to call for an increase in defense spending. Speaking less than a month after the Ukrainian loss of Crimea, Ponta claimed that Romania has to assume the role of guardian of one of Europe's and NATO's borders and raise military spending over the next few years to reach 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). 20 The need to increase Romania's defense spending was reiterated more forcefully by the Romanian president, Klaus Iohannis, in early 2015 when he claimed that Europe faces its biggest security challenge since the Cold War following the Russian annexation of Crimea. President Iohannis stated that there was an urgent need for Romania to increase its defense spending so that it could buy more modern military equipment and fighter jets due to its proximity to the crisis and the fact that Russia had "resorted to force to redesign its borders." 21 The protracted conflict in the east and the vulnerability of the city of Mariupol, an industrial port located on the Azov Sea some one hundred kilometers from the rebel capital of Donetsk, has brought military conflict to the shores of the Black Sea again. Mariupol has become a key battleground and the frontline in the conflict in the east between Russian-backed separatists and Ukrainian forces. Mariupol is an important strategic prize for the separatists and would give them control of the two hundred miles of coastline running from Donetsk to Crimea, effectively halving Ukraine's Azov Sea and Black Sea coastline. The seizure of Mariupol would also provide a potential land corridor from Russia to the Crimean Peninsula, significantly enhancing Russia's maritime reach.
After separatists seized the city's administrative buildings in the spring of 2014, Mariupol was effectively brought back under Ukrainian control in June 2014. In August 2014, the rebels launched another offensive to take Mariupol, which was halted by the signing of the Minsk Agreement. However, conflict resumed in January 2015, when Mariupol was shelled again by the separatists, killing thirty people and injuring eighty-three others. 22 The battle for Mariupol is, however, far from over, suggesting that the threat to Ukraine's maritime borders of the Black Sea will continue for some time. In August 2016, one Ukrainian soldier was killed and five were wounded after the separatists launched an intense artillery barrage near Mariupol. Shyrokyne, a seaside village just east of Mariupol, was attacked sixteen times by Russian-backed separatists, nine of them with heavy weaponry. 23 A month later, there were reports from Ukraine's Antiterrorist Operations Headquarters that rebels had again fired on Ukrainian positions near Mariupol. 24 At the same time that events are destabilizing the shores of the Black Sea, conflict at sea has also increased. In December 2015, Russia hijacked three offshore oil-drilling rigs worth hundreds of millions of dollars, located in Ukrainian territorial water at the Odessa gas field, about one hundred kilometers east of Ukraine's coastline, and towed them back to Crimea. 25 26. "Russia Sets Up Offshore Drilling Rigs in Ukraine's Black Sea Waters," Ukraine Today, 25 July 2016, www.kyivpost.com/article/content/ukraine-politics/ukraine-today-russia-sets-up-offshore -drilling-rigs-in-ukraine-black-sea-waters-video-419477.html. Indicating that this move could signal further sea-based conflict in the near future, Ukraine's State Border Service claimed that these illegal seizures demonstrated that Russia plans to begin drilling for oil in Ukraine's exclusive economic zone (EEZ). This fear was confirmed in July 2016, when Ukrainian border guards spotted jack-up rigs, stationary platforms, and support vessels under Russia's national flag in the Odessa and Holitsyno gas field located in Ukraine's EEZ. 26 Fearing additional possible Russian incursions and drilling in its EEZ, in February 2016, the Ukrainian Navy and the State Border Service's Marine Guards enhanced the security of Zmiinyi Island in the Black Sea near Ukraine. 27 Zmiinyi Island, with a population of about one hundred, is part of Odessa Oblast and sits about midway between the Odeske natural gas fields and the coast of Odessa Oblast. A unit of Ukrainian marines equipped with heavy weapons landed on Zmiinyi Island in an attempt to prevent further encroachment by Russia into the Ukrainian EEZ. 28 In a further sign of conflict at sea, a Ukrainian coast guard ship involved in intelligence gathering near the west coast of Crimea was directly confronted by two Russian combat patrol ships and an SU-24 bomber. 29 The potential for future sea-and land-based conflict is further increased in the Black Sea by the development of a separatist "micronavy" by the Russian-backed forces in the east. There is increasing evidence to suggest that the separatists are building their own maritime capabilities, including cutters armed with large caliber weapons. 30 A report by a pro-Russian newspaper in May 2015 claimed that an Azov flotilla, with a maritime Spetsnaz element, had been set up in the Donetsk People's Republic. 31 ment by the separatists of a small, highly mobile fleet equipped with antitank guided missiles, automatic grenade launchers, and machine guns, able to carry out attacks on shipping and ports or land forces and conduct raids or sabotage missions, is clearly a serious threat to maritime security in the Black Sea. In August 2016, there were also reports that the separatists had practiced carrying out and defending against an amphibious landing. A video of the event shows soldiers landing ashore in several dozen small speedboats and BTR-80 amphibious armored personnel carriers. 32 Although the reach of this potential amphibious force is currently limited without landing ships, local media reports claimed that the separatists had demonstrated a high level of combat readiness in both defensive and offensive coastal operations. 33 In a sign of the seriousness of this threat, the Ukrainian Defense Ministry announced that Ukrainian marines, coastal artillery, and other naval detachments were taking part in antiterrorist operations in order prepare to "deter an armed aggression from the sea." 34 The Russian seizure of Crimea has also created tension between littoral states over the future demarcation of maritime borders, because Russia has gained sovereignty over an estimated thirty-six-thousand square miles of maritime territory in the Black Sea, more than double its previous zone. 35 Given that Crimea is a peninsula with a very complex geography, many of the existing maritime demarcation lines in the Black Sea are likely to become contested. The most serious maritime dispute is likely to be between Ukraine and Russia over the demarcation of their respective maritime zones. A redefinition of maritime borders between Russia and Ukraine -based on the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea and assumed Russian ownership of 36. Wlodzimierz Kacynski, "Reshaping the Sea: Ukraine's Dismal Future in Black Sea Basin" (Seattle: Ellison Centre for Russian, East European and Central Asian Studies, University of Washington, 9 April 2014), jsis.washington.edu/ellisoncenter/news/reshaping-the-sea-ukraines-dismal -future-in-black-sea-basin/. 37. Maksym Bugriy, "The Cost to Ukraine of Crimea's Annexation," Eurasia Daily Monitor, 14 April 2014. 38. "Kiev Taking Moscow to Court: Who Will Get Black Sea Gas?" Eurasia Daily, 1 September 2016, eadaily.com/en/news/2016/09/01/kiev-taking-moscow-to-court-who-will-get-black-sea-gas. 39. Roman Olearchyk, "Ukraine Hits Russia with Another Legal Claim," Financial Times, 14 September 2016 (subscription required), www.ft.com/content/c7b5fd3f-c315-3ead-abb9-1e2a05c451a6.
Crimea -would dramatically reduce the Ukrainian zone and EEZ. Ukraine would lose almost half of its coastline and be left with a small area of maritime jurisdiction, which would run from the northern point of Crimea up to the mouth of the Danube and include a small part of the Sea of Azov but without access to this enclosed sea through the Russian-controlled Kerch Straits. 36 The demarcation of maritime boundaries is likely to be controversial, because both states are keen to exploit the gas reserves located in the Black Sea. These unresolved maritime boundaries have also created additional tension between Russia and Ukraine over who owns the gas reserves located in Ukraine's EEZ, which are currently controlled by a Russian company. After the annexation, Russia nationalized Ukraine's Naftogaz Company in Crimea, which manages Chernomorneftegaz and operates a gas field in Ukraine's EEZ supplying 60 percent of Crimea's energy needs. The newly nationalized company currently operates four gas deposits on the Black Sea shelf and three deposits onshore in the Crimean Peninsula. 37 Igor Shaboanov, Chernomorneftegaz's director general, has admitted that his company's gas fields, located off Odessa, have an uncertain legal maritime status. Under the current UNCLOS, the Odessa gas fields are actually in Ukraine's economic zone, even though they are now controlled and operated by a Russian company. 38 In a sign of growing Ukrainian concern about its truncated maritime zone and Russia's seizure of maritime assets, including the gas fields, in Ukraine's EEZ, the government has launched a maritime arbitration claim against the Russian Federation under UNCLOS. A statement by Ukraine's Ministry of Finance accuses Russia of usurping and interfering with Ukraine's maritime rights as a coastal state in maritime zones adjacent to Crimea in the Black Sea, the Sea of Azov, and the Kerch Straits. 39 The statement also claims that Russia has violated UNCLOS and Ukraine's rights to the natural resources located offshore of the Crimea, which belong to the Ukrainian people.
Russian and Romanian EEZs in the Black Sea, once separated by Ukrainian territorial claims, are now adjacent to one another. The lack of clarity over this new maritime boundary could be problematic in the future, as both Romania and Russia are seeking to exploit energy reserves in their EEZ. There is considerable uncertainty as to whether the Russian annexation necessitates a renegotiation of maritime boundaries between Romania and Russia as neighboring coastal states under UNCLOS and moreover whether Russia could now terminate international agreements already signed between Ukraine and Romania threatening Romania's ability to develop its underwater energy resources. 40 In particular, Russia could decide to challenge the 2009 ruling by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the status of Ukraine's Snake Island and the maritime borders between Romania and Ukraine. 41 The Hague ruled that ninety-seven hundred square meters out of a disputed twelve-thousand-square-meter maritime economic area should be transferred to Romania. 42 Russia could argue that the ICJ ruling is not binding, as its decisions are binding only on those parties who consent to settle their disputes in the court.
An additional maritime security challenge in the Black Sea has been the state of relations between the two key players: Russia and Turkey. Since the crisis in Ukraine, relations between them have deteriorated significantly, and while there has been a recent attempt to normalize relations, geopolitical rivalries between these two states will continue to shape the maritime security environment in the Black Sea. 43 In November 2015, relations between Russia and Turkey deteriorated rapidly, essentially destroying their "strategic partnership," after the Turkish air force shot down a Russian Su-24 fighter jet bomber that had entered Turkish airspace, the third violation since Russia began hitting ground targets in Syria. 44 President Vladimir Putin described this incident as a "stab in the back" by Turkey and in a war of words went so far as to accuse President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of profiting from the sale of oil by the so-called Islamic State. 45 The Russian government also imposed restrictions on Turkish agricultural imports and charter flights between the two countries, hitting the Turkish economy hard. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development estimated that Russian sanctions would reduce Turkey's GDP growth in 2016 by around 0.3 -0.7 percentage points. 46 As a result of these sanctions, the number of Russian tourists visiting Turkey dropped to almost zero, threatening the whole sector with additional knock-on effects in the construction and real estate industries. 47 In an attempt to address the sharp deterioration of relations and the effects on the Turkish economy, President Erdogan wrote a letter expressing his regret for the incident to the family of the Russian pilot shot down by Turkish forces, and two months later, in August 2016, the Turkish and Russian presidents met in St. Petersburg in an attempt to rebuild their relationship. 48 At a joint press conference afterward, President Putin spoke about the need to restore Russian-Turkish trade, resume energy projects, lift restrictions on tourism, and reopen Russia's construction sector to Turkish firms and workers. 49 In an attempt to further normalize relations, President Putin was also one of the first leaders to condemn the Turkish coup in July and, unlike the European Union, has refrained from criticizing the subsequent crackdown. 50 Despite what is ostensibly the "reset" of economic relations between these key players in the Black Sea, relations are likely to remain strained and difficult as major disagreements remain over Syria, as do concerns about the Crimean authorities' treatment of the Crimean Tatars.
Turkey shares a long land border with Syria, hosts up to 3 million Syrian refugees, and has a very different view of the Syrian uprising and the future of Syria than its Black Sea neighbor, the Russian Federation. These differences have brought the two key gatekeepers in the Black Sea to the brink of conflict and will not be easily or simply resolved. While Russia supports the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria against its opponents and has increased its military support since September 2015, Turkey has been arming various Syrian opposition groups since 2011 and formally severed ties with the Assad regime in March 2012.
The two nations also hold opposing views on the role and future of Syria's Kurds. Moscow has supported the most dominant Kurdish faction, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), which Ankara views as part of the Kurdistan Workers Party and a terrorist organization that threatens the Turkish state. Although the Syrian Kurds have proved to be the most effective fighting force on the ground against the Islamic State, Ankara has sought to undermine them militarily, fearing that a strong Kurdish presence in Syria will help bolster Kurdish insurgents at home. 51 As a result of these differences, tensions between Turkey and Russia increased significantly over 2016 after the Russian military intervention in Syria. 52 In November 2015, Russia intensified its air strikes on positions in northern Latakia, which has settlements of Turkmen people, who are culturally and linguistically close to Turkey, which sees them as a moderate opposition to the Syrian regime, while Moscow sees them as insurgents and terrorists. The Russian bombing of the Turkmen people was one of the contributing factors that led to the shooting down of the Russian aircraft by Turkey and triggered the collapse of what were already deteriorating and very strained relations. The collapse was cemented when Russia moved quickly to reinforce its position in Syria by deploying advanced anti-aircraft missile systems, patrolled areas near the Turkish border, increased its bombing of Turkishbacked opposition groups, and increased its support for the PYD forces in the canton of Afrin in northwest Syria. 54 In July 2016, however, in light of the more general attempt to reset relations discussed earlier, Russia and Turkey announced that they would begin to coordinate their policies over Syria. 55 It is clear that while Turkey and Russia share common interests, such as the desire for political unity and territorial integrity in Syria, they do not agree on how to achieve these goals. In a sign of the continuing differences between the two states, at the World Energy Congress in Istanbul in October 2016, just before his meeting with Putin, Erdogan talked about the "hordes" of Russian jets in Syrian skies and drew attention to the humanitarian consequences of the Aleppo blockade. 56 Despite the convergence of interests, Russia and Turkey remain at odds over Syria, there is no agreement on what a future political settlement in Syria would actually look like, and, despite the economic reset, relations are likely to remain strained and difficult in the medium term.
The second area of tension between Turkey and Russia that affects maritime security cooperation in the Black Sea is the growing persecution of the Crimean Tatars after the Russian annexation of Crimea. Crimea, previously part of the Ottoman Empire before it was effectively ceded to Russian control after the Russian victory in the wars of 1768 -74, is home to a sizable Turkic ethnic population, the Tatars, with whom the Turks share common cultural, linguistic, religious, and historical traditions. The Crimean Tatars have a long history of persecution. They were deported in large numbers by Stalin to Central Asia in 1944 for allegedly collaborating with the Nazis and in the 1980s started to move back to Crimea, where they currently make up 12 percent of the population. 57 Although the Turkish government has avoided directly criticizing the Russian annexation of Crimea, it has emphasized that Ukraine's territorial integrity, sovereignty, and political unity need to be protected and stated that it will use "determined diplomacy" to protect the rights of the Crimean Tatars. 58 Tension between Russia and Turkey over the plight of the Tatars has increased, given the persecution and the rollback of their rights and privileges in the peninsula. In an early sign of problems, a Crimean Tatar resident was found dead just days after the referendum in March 2014, after he attended a protest against Russian troop presence in the peninsula. 59 As a result of opposition in their population, the Tatars largely boycotted the referendum on Russia's annexation of Crimea, and the Mejlis, the Tatar governing body, refused to recognize Russian rule. In response, two of the Tatar community's most prominent leaders, Mustafa Szemileve and Refat Chubarov, have been barred by the Crimean authorities from entering the peninsula. 60 Also since then, any Tatar critics of Moscow have been subject to deportation, threats, and kidnapping and nineteen Crimean Tatars went missing in the first year of annexation. 61 More recently, the Crimean Tatars have been threatened for using their own language, there has been a crackdown on meetings and on Tatar media, and cultural gatherings have been banned. 62 In a strongly worded April 2016 statement, the Turkish government condemned the Crimean Supreme Court's decision to ban the Crimean Tatars' Mejlis, claiming this was a new "manifestation of both the systematic and collective pressure on the Crimean Tatar community." 63 Further increasing tension between Ankara and Moscow, the Crimean Tatars have organized a blockade of Crimea and are suspected of blowing up electricity pylons, which disrupted power supplies from Ukraine to the peninsula. 64 In addition, in late 2015 Ankara backed the formation of a controversial Islamic battalion in Ukraine based in Kherson, from which it could either reinforce the front in the Donbas or support the Tatar-led blockade of Crimea. 65 At a recent meeting in Kyiv, the Turkish president reiterated his support for the Crimean Tatars, clearly indicating that the reset in relations with Russia has not changed Turkey's policy and the continued persecution of the Tatars would continue to further damage relations. 66 Russia's relations with the West have also been pushed to the breaking point because of the Russian annexation of Crimea and subsequent events in the region. This creates a less benign maritime security environment for all littoral states, hampering regional maritime security operations. Both Ukraine and Georgia have increased their cooperation with NATO, and the United States has significantly increased its maritime presence in the region, further increasing tension with the Russian Federation. In March 2014, the former NATO secretary-general, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, announced that NATO and Ukraine would increase their military cooperation in light of the "gravest threat to European security since the end of the Cold War." 67 NATO has also reconfirmed its commitment to work closely with Georgia and to strengthen its partnership. In November 2015, NATO demonstrated its sup-port for Ukraine by signing several agreements aimed at improving the effectiveness of the Ukrainian military, improving the country's defense industry, and countering Russian propaganda. 68 NATO also suspended all practical military and civilian military cooperation with Moscow and stepped up military maneuvers, sending surveillance planes to Poland and US fighter jets to the Baltic States. 69 More recently, NATO has also pledged to further increase its military presence in the region. In a recent statement, NATO secretarygeneral Jens Stoltenberg stated that NATO needed to deliver credible deterrence, particularly in the Black Sea region, where Russia is increasing its military potential in Crimea and threatening rhetoric. 70 The commitment by the United States to maintaining a regular forward presence in the region has further strained already difficult relations with Moscow. Speaking in September 2015 Vice Admiral James Foggo, deputy commander of US Naval Forces Europe, stated that the United States was making its "presence in the region 'normal,' and we are conducing regular and frequent exercises and engagements with navies in the area." 71 As part of its commitment to the Black Sea, the United States also increased the number of troops and aircraft stationed in the Mihail Kogalniceanu (MK) military base in Romania. More recently, it has expanded its capabilities to perform further presence-based operations in the port of Constanta, in its training hubs in the MK base, and in the Novo Selo Training Area in Bulgaria. 72 Considering these commitments and US maritime presence, tension between Russia and the United States in the Black Sea has increased significantly. In June 2016, Russian warplanes made several passes over a US destroyer operating in the region, in response to what Russian media claimed was its provocative and aggressive action. 73 In response the US navy secretary, Ray Maybus, stated that the United States would continue to operate in the Black Sea, because its aim was "to deter aggression and keep sea lanes open." 74 Three months later US officials revealed that a Russian fighter plane had flown within three meters of one of its reconnaissance aircraft operating in the Black Sea. 75 The Russian defense ministry claimed that the US plane, which was operating in international airspace, had been approaching Russian territory with its transponder turned off. Given the increased US commitment to the Black Sea, the potential for escalation and perhaps miscalculation in the region is likely to remain high in the medium term, creating a more challenging maritime security environment for all six littoral states and the United States.
New Maritime Security Threats
The Black Sea littoral states also face several important new maritime security challenges. 76 The emergence of traditional maritime security threats already discussed has, however, made the two most important newer maritime security issues -pollution and nuclear trafficking -much harder to address. The ability to resolve these two key issues through cooperative measures is ultimately hostage to good or at least cordial relations among littoral states. The deterioration in those relations and the potential for conflict in the region has hampered the states' ability and desire to collectively address and manage these issues.
Pollution has radically changed the Black Sea ecosystem and seriously threatens biodiversity and the use of the sea by littoral states for fishing, tour- ism, and recreation. The Black Sea is considered one of the seas most damaged by human activity. One-third of the land area of continental Europe drains into this sea. The second, third, and fourth major European rivers, the Danube, Dniper, and Don, discharge into this semi-enclosed sea, while its only connection to the world's oceans is through the narrow Strait of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles. The inflows of nutrients from major rivers make the Black Sea very prone to eutrophication, a buildup of nutrients that causes dense growth of plant life. This phenomenon is made worse by the agricultural and urban discharges carried by the rivers and by direct discharges from coastal ports and industrial zones around the Black Sea area. 77 This process of eutrophication, which causes the overproduction of phytoplankton, blocks light from reaching the sea grasses and algae, has damaged fish stocks and beaches, and increased the incidence of waterborne diseases in the Black Sea. 78 As a result of this pollution and overfishing, 85 percent of the Black Sea's marine life, including twenty of the sea's twenty-six commercial fish species, have become extinct in the past twenty years. 79 Suggesting that the problem is primarily local, however, and would require local solutions, it has been estimated that the littoral states are responsible for up to 70 percent of the nutrients flowing into the Black Sea, with the remainder entering via the main rivers.
In addition to eutrophication, chemical pollution is a major problem. 80 Operational or illegal discharges of oil by maritime vessels are a very real concern, particularly along major shipping routes and ports in the Black Sea. As a result of these discharges, the worst surface oil pollution is concentrated along the main shipping routes in the Black Sea between Istanbul and Novorossiysk, Istanbul and Odessa, and Istanbul and Tuapse, as ships discharge oil containing waste several times along their routes. 81 Illegal discharges of oil have also increased in the Black Sea and cause considerable harm to the sea ecosystem. 82 Oil patches often covering tens of square kilometers are regularly detected. The region has also become an area of energy production, transportation, and distribution, further increasing the future risk of oil pollution. Ports in both Russia and Georgia also have terminals for oil and gas pipelines from the Caspian Sea, increasing the risks of a future spill. The role of the Black Sea as a transit route for both oil and gas exports is also likely to increase in the future, threatening the already fragile ecosystem. Turkey is particularly concerned about the increase in oil shipping through the Bosporus, one of the world's busiest and most dangerous waterways, which runs directly through Istanbul. Around fifty thousand ships sail through the Bosporus every year, including at least ten thousand oil tankers. 83 Tensions in the region and strained relations among states are hampering the ability to resolve these issues. While the Black Sea Convention, signed by all six littoral states in 1994, set up a regional cooperation framework to protect against pollution, this issue has effectively fallen off the political agenda, and pollution monitoring has been seriously compromised. Ukrainian environmental authorities in Odessa are currently unable to monitor pollution around Crimea, and talks among Black Sea littoral states have been suspended. 84 In addition to these environmental issues, the Black Sea is widely recognized as being at the center of the world's nuclear black market, and nuclear trafficking is a serious and growing maritime security threat. There were over 630 nuclear-trafficking incidents recorded in the Black Sea between 1991 and 2012, and five of the seven more recent incidents have involved the unauthorized possession of highly enriched uranium. 85 Highlighting the scale of the problem, in the first six months of 2016, there were three incidents involving the trafficking of radioactive materials in Georgia. In an April 2016 incident, Georgian officials arrested five men who had transported uranium isotopes for sale to the Black Sea coastal resort of Kobuleti not far from the Turkish border. 86 Several seizures of uranium and other radioactive material in other Black Sea ports also suggest that maritime routes have been used for nuclear smuggling. Concealed small amounts of nuclear or radioactive material is harder to detect aboard large cargo ships, particularly as these are less likely to be monitored for radioactivity and the material can be easily unloaded onto small boats. Indicating the scale of the maritime security problem, local authorities in the Georgian port of Batumi have intercepted eight nuclear-smuggling attempts since 1999, the most recent in 2012, and there have been ten nuclear-trafficking incidents in and around the Ukrainian port of Odessa. 87 Exacerbating this problem of nuclear trafficking is the presence of ungoverned spaces in the Black Sea region, which have increasingly become a source of and haven for nuclear smuggling. With the declaration of independence by Lugansk and Donetsk in the east of Ukraine in 2014, there are now five unresolved or "frozen" conflicts in the wider Black Sea that provide ungoverned spaces. These include Nagorno Karabakh, the disputed enclave between Armenia and Azerbaijan; Transnistria in Moldova; Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia; and the Donbas in the east of Ukraine. Unresolved separatist conflicts have created a belt of internationally unrecognized but de facto states that operate in an environment of lawlessness and provide fertile ground and safe havens for organized-crime smuggling networks. Ungoverned spaces in the wider Black Sea are particularly attractive for nuclear smuggling, as they often host industrial facilities and military bases containing 88. Ibid. 89. "National Progress Report: Ukraine" (Washington, DC: Nuclear Security Summit, 2016), www .nss2016.org/document-center-docs/2016/3/31/national-progress-report-ukraine. 90. Sanders, "Maritime Security in the Black Sea." 91. "Russia Suspends Participation in BLACKSEAFOR Naval Drills Following Su-24 Incident," UNIAN Information Agency, 27 November 2015, www.unian.info/world/1195912-russia-suspends -participation-in-blackseafor-naval-drills-following-su-24-incident.html. nuclear material and have lenient penal codes and lax or corrupt law enforcement systems. 88 Suggesting the scale of the problem posed by ungoverned spaces in 2014, the Ukrainian Security Services arrested nine people trying to smuggle nuclear material from Transnistria to eastern Ukraine. Raising further concern about nuclear smuggling from ungoverned spaces, Kyiv has now lost regulatory control over its nuclear sources and facilities in eastern Ukraine due to the ongoing conflict, including sixty-five entities that use ionizing radiation, including eight with very high-level radiation sources and one repository of radioactive waste near a Donetsk chemical plant. 89 The inability of the Black Sea states to address these maritime security threats has led to the freezing of two regional maritime security operations. The Black Sea Naval Co-operation Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR) was established in 2001 by the six Black Sea littoral states to engage in search-andrescue operations, humanitarian assistance, sea-mine clearing, environmental protection, and goodwill visits. The objective was to turn BLACKSEAFOR into a standing multinational maritime task force, with permanent headquarters capable of dealing effectively with maritime security threats, including pollution and trafficking. Black Sea Harmony, initiated by the Turkish government in 2004, was set up to deter, disrupt, and prevent the risks and potential threats of terrorism, illicit trafficking, and weapons of mass destruction, along with their means of delivery and related nuclear materials. 90 Following the downing of the Russian jet by Turkey and the sharp deterioration in relations, Russia announced that it had suspended "indefinitely" its participation in BLACKSEAFOR naval operations. 91 More recent discussions about setting up a NATO maritime patrol operation in the Black Sea have also stalled, suggesting that the littoral states are no closer to finding an effective way of addressing new maritime security threats. In early 2016, the Romanian government called on NATO to create a Black Sea flotilla. 92 A few months later, in May 2016, Turkish president Erdogan appeared to support the initiative by calling for NATO naval reinforcements in the Black Sea, claiming it was at risk of turning into a "Russian lake" threatening the security of all the littoral states. 93 A report published by the Atlantic Council titled "Restoring the Power and Purpose of the NATO Alliance" published a month later also called for the establishment of a NATO maritime force in the Black Sea because of Russia's rapidly escalating offensive posture in the region. 94 The Bulgarian government has, however, vociferously opposed the establishment of a NATO maritime security operation in the Black Sea, as it could further increase conflict in the region. In response to the proposal, the Bulgarian prime minister, Boiko Boriso, stated, "I do not want war in the Black Sea. We shouldn't be deploying troops there in ships and aircraft, especially during the tourist season." 95 Russia has also, unsurprisingly, reacted negatively to the proposal for a NATO maritime security operation in the Black Sea. Alexander Grushko, Russia's permanent representative to NATO, said that the Black Sea will not become a NATO lake, stating that Moscow would use all necessary measures to neutralize possible threats and attempts at military presence in the region. 96 More recently, in light of the reset of relations with Russia, the Turkish government has backed away from the idea of an increased NATO maritime presence in the Black Sea. 97 98. "Turkish Naval Forces Have Set Sail towards Becoming a Medium-Force Projection Navy," Defence Turkey, 25 November 2014, www.defenceturkey.com/en/content/turkish-naval-forces-have -set-sail-towards-becoming-a-medium-global-force-projection-navy-1758#.WNFh5jvyiUk. 99. Vladimir Socor, "NATO Can Refloat Romania's Black Sea Naval Initiative (part two)," Eurasia Daily Monitor, 19 July 2016, jamestown.org/program/nato-can-refloat-romanias-black-sea-naval -initiative-part-two/.
Turkey, keen to protect its sovereign rights over the Turkish Straits, has traditionally been opposed to any attempt to increase NATO's maritime presence in the region. Turkey's opposition was made clear by the former head of Turkish Naval Forces, who stated, "Maritime security in the Black Sea should be sustained by Black Sea littoral states." 98 In light of Bulgarian and Turkish opposition, NATO has decided to defer consideration of this proposal, although Romania has perhaps rather optimistically announced that it will continue working with Bulgaria, Turkey, and NATO authorities to promote this initiative. 99
Conclusion
Traditional maritime security challenges have returned to the Black Sea, and this has had a profoundly negative effect on the ability of the six littoral states to also address newer maritime security challenges. The most serious of these traditional challenges has been the buildup of Russian forces in Crimea and the increase in its power-projection capabilities. This has created a far less secure and much more threatening maritime domain for all the littoral states. Russian support, training, and backing of the separatists in the east of Ukraine has also brought conflict directly to the shores of the Black Sea for the first time since 2008. The building of a small maritime capability by the separatists also directly increases the prospects of future sea-based and land-based conflict in the region. The Russian annexation of Crimea has created uncertainty over the demarcation of maritime borders in the Black Sea and increased tensions among riparian states. Growing tension and the eventual breakdown in relations between the two key players in the Black Sea, Russia and Turkey, in 2015 also created a far less permissive and much more challenging maritime domain for all littoral states. Although economic relations have been reset, continued tensions over the future of Syria and the persecution by the Crimean authorities of the Crimean Tatars hamper any attempt to normalize relations between these two states. The increase in US engagement in the Black Sea and NATO engagement with Georgia and Ukraine has further exacerbated regional tensions.
As a result of the emergence of these more traditional maritime security challenges, newer but no less important security issues have been pushed off the agenda. Interstate or more conventional maritime security challenges have not only crowded out new security issues but also undermined regional cooperative mechanisms and measures aimed at addressing these challenges. The freezing of the BLACKSEAFOR and Black Sea Harmony maritime security operations, in light of poor relations, as well as the failure to agree on the setting up of a NATO Black Sea flotilla, have effectively undermined the ability of littoral states to address the threats posed by pollution and the rise in nuclear trafficking. The ability to address these transnational maritime security threats is ultimately dependent on cordial relations among littoral states or at least the recognition of common interests. In the Black Sea, relations have in effect reached a breaking point, hampering the ability of the littoral states to cooperate in the management of these new threats.
